EU faces a difficult choice – where the pendulum will swing?

Published in Politics
Friday, 17 June 2022 22:25

European Commission is drawing closer to presenting its opinion on candidate status to Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova – members of the Association Trio. Meanwhile, questions and suggestions are mounting how to proceed in this way to find a “golden mean” amidst the war in Ukraine and highly unpredictable geostrategic context.

The stakes are high and considering all circumstances the European Union (EU) faces a difficult but historical decision. While, it is premature to talk in which direction the scales will swing, it’s evident that either negative or some intermediary decision about on any of the applicant state, will significantly affect their geopolitical future in the short and mid-term perspective.  What about Georgia – the sole strategic ally of the West in the South Caucasus, the situation with regard to the status, still remains unclear. While we watch Ukraine as arena of a brutal geopolitical competition between the West and Russia on the European theater, Georgia remains another arena of geopolitical rivalry between Russia and the West. The absence of war nowadays, doesn’t mean it will not be unleashed tomorrow, if Russia finds Georgia alienated by the West. Thus, it's safe to say that EU candidate status for Georgia is highly likely to strengthen the EU foothold in the region and have a far-reaching influence on the other states of the region.   

Before the pendant conclusion of the European Commission about candidate status for Georgia some opinions are present  both in Georgia and outside  calling the EU on either refraining from granting the status to Georgia, or suggesting something transitional. These suggestions are largely generated by ongoing domestic political infighting in the country. 

The benefits from granting candidate status to Georgia, which considerably outstrips other members of the Association Trio by the pace of fulfillment of the components of the EU Association Agreement appeared to be far more tangible, than conditional gains in case of refusal.

Let's put the questions specifically and directly. Whether it’s a prudent step to hold Georgia back from the candidate status, as some groups argue, and detach it somehow from the Association Trio in this truly extraordinary situation?  

What will the EU gain and what will it lose if decides to grant candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova, and say "NO" to Georgia, or give it something different? Hardly this “cold shower” from the EU would contribute to political stability in Georgia, which is apparently important for the EU in this turbulent geopolitical environment.  Georgia’s opposition groups and their supporters are highly likely to use this “NO” to embark on mass anti-governmental protests and Georgia is expected to plunge into another cycle of confrontation, turbulence, and uncertainty, with the ensuing consequences. It’s hard to imagine that the EU would be satisfied with such state of affairs in its key partner in the region.

Refusal to grant Georgia candidate status under any plausible pretext, can significantly increase not only Euro-skepticism but outright anti-Western sentiments in a sizeable part of Georgian society, providing anti-Western forces with an excellent opportunity to increase their influence and strengthen their stance. Nowadays, they are quite industrious in creating an anti-European atmosphere in society. Will the EU be satisfied with this perspective?

Pinning hope that the refusal to give a candidate’s status will force Georgia’s ruling party to become more malleable to the EU demands looks unconvinced. Quite the contrary, the care for its own political future, will make the current government far more dutybound to implement the EU-recommended reforms. The idea cultivated by some Georgian and foreign pundits and politicians that Georgia will better meet EU standards under the new government after the pre-term elections, looks rather emotional than well-calculated. If consider the balance of political powers in Georgia, as well as composition of the current political landscape, this scenario looks unrealistic.

And, last but not least,the status of the candidate for EU membership is not an act of mercy for Georgia. It will give the country a strong and unequivocal signal from the EU to take the road to justice, peace and security, or be faced, even more than before, with tension and confrontation that would not be in the interests of any party. It’s time for making extraordinary but geopolitically far-sighted decisions.

Zaal Anjaparidze, political analyst, Tbilisi, Georgia

Туркменистан и Россия готовят к подписанию документы о торгово-экономическом сотрудничестве

Published in World
Friday, 10 June 2022 21:44

 

Туркменистан и Россия готовят к подписанию ряд документов о торгово-экономическом сотрудничестве, их планируется заключить во время первого официального визита президента Сердара Бердымухамедова в Российскую Федерацию 10 июня, говорится в сообщении правительства РФ.

Накануне переговоров на высшем уровне заместитель председателя правительства Российской Федерации Александр Новак провел встречу с вице-премьером Туркменистана Шахымом Абдрахмановым.

Решение избранного президента Туркменистана совершить свой первый официальный зарубежный визит именно в Россию подтверждает курс официального Ашхабада на дальнейшее укрепление отношений с Москвой, отметил Александр Новак в ходе встречи.

Вице-премьер России отметил значительную роль топливно-энергетического комплекса в экономическом взаимодействии двух стран. «ТЭК исторически занимает одно из основных мест в нашем торгово-экономическом обороте. Туркмения обладает значительными запасами природного газа, по этой линии ведется успешное сотрудничество «Газпрома» с «Туркменгазом», заключен договор на покупку-продажу туркменского газа с 1 июля 2019 года. Кроме того, Россия оказывает услуги по транспортировке туркменской нефти, идет взаимодействие в нефтяной сфере, продолжается работа по реконструкции туркменских энергетических объектов», – сказал Александр Новак.

Также Россия и Туркменистан имеют значительные возможности для увеличения грузовых потоков по восточному маршруту международного транспортного коридора «Север – Юг». Уже сейчас российские компании активно прорабатывают с туркменскими коллегами вопросы своего участия в проектах электрификации железнодорожных линий Туркменистана, модернизации его железнодорожной инфраструктуры. Совместными усилиями мы решим вопрос привлечения транзитных грузов, в целом реализуем транзитный потенциал Туркменистана, отметил Новак.

Александр Новак передал туркменской делегации приглашения посетить 25-й Петербургский международный экономический форум, а также пригласил к участию во втором Каспийском экономическом форуме и Российском энергетическом форуме, запланированными на осень этого года.

У Туркменбаши появился российский город-побратим

Published in World
Friday, 10 June 2022 21:43

Соглашение о сотрудничестве между Астраханской областью (РФ) и Балканским регионом Туркменистана, соглашение о побратимстве между городами Астраханью и Туркменбаши, соглашение в сфере образования – это итоги встречи в Москве посла Туркменистана в Российской Федерации Батыра Ниязлиева с вице-губернатором и председателем правительства Астраханской области Олегом Князевым.

В переговорах от российской стороны также приняли участие глава муниципального образования «Город Астрахань» Олег Полумордвинов, министр внешних связей Астраханской области Владимир Головков, ректор Астраханского госуниверситета Константин Маркелов.

Участниками встречи было отмечено, что спектр отношений между Астраханской и Балканской областями может быть весьма широким. Прежде всего это сотрудничество в сферах развития морского транспортного сообщения, судостроения, туризма.

Уже вышеупомянутое соглашение в сфере образования подписали ректоры Астраханского государственного университета им. В.Н. Татищева Константин Маркелов и Туркменского государственного университета имени Махтумкули Байрамгуль Ораздурдыева. Вузы двух стран договорились о реализации совместных проектов, академических обменах, организации курсов повышения квалификации, разработке и реализации образовательных программ, выдаче двойных дипломов.

Начался официальный визит Сердара Бердымухамедова в Россию

Published in World
Friday, 10 June 2022 21:41

В пятницу начался официальный визит президента Туркменистана Сердара Бердымухамедова в Россию, в рамках которого состоятся переговоры с главой РФ Владимиром Путиным, пишут официальные туркменские СМИ.

Первый визит Сердара Бердымухамедова в Россию в качестве главы государства придаст импульс развитию многопланового туркмено-российского диалога, отмечается в анонсе.

По итогам встречи президентов Туркменистана и России ожидается подписание Декларации об углублении стратегического партнерства между станами. Также планируется подписать ряд документов о торгово-экономическом сотрудничестве.

EU condemns Russia’s attempts to forcefully integrate parts of Ukraine

Published in World
Tuesday, 07 June 2022 09:10

The European Union strongly condemns Russia’s attempts to forcefully integrate parts of Ukrainian territory.

On 25 May and 30 May, the Russian president issued decrees, simplifying the process for granting Russian citizenship and issuing Russian passports to Ukrainian citizens of the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions, which are temporarily under Russian military control, as well as to Ukrainian children without parental care and legally incapacitated persons from Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions. 

The European Union will not recognise these passports, issued as part of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine,” said EU High Representative Josep Borrell in a declaration issued on behalf of the EU. 

The EU also strongly condemns any attempts by Russia to replace democratically elected and legitimate Ukrainian administrations, to introduce the Russian rouble as a parallel currency to the Ukrainian hryvnia, and to impose Russian curricula and education materials and change the language of tuition in schools in those parts of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions that are currently under the illegal control of Russian armed forces.

Any attempts to alter the status of parts of Ukrainian territory are a clear violation of international law, the UN Charter and Ukraine’s Constitution, they further undermine sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, and will not be recognised by the European Union,” said the declaration by Borrell.

Find out more

Press release

Charity Evening «NOW»

Published in Society
Friday, 03 June 2022 17:33

NOW is an association of artists from different countries who have gathered to host a charity event in support of Ukraine.  The event will present different areas of anti-war art: actionism, performance art, audiovisual art, music, cinema. During the war, we, the artists, must continue to speak the language that is available to us — the language of art. Also we will conduct the auction, where everyone can buy anti-war art, all the proceeds from sales will also go to charity.

Exhibition would be curated by patron of the art Ria Keburia, performance art — by poet and performer Andro Dadiani, photography section — by Elene Glonti.

The event will represent many different kinds of art:

- Salome Jashi and Tornike Bziava participate in the short movie screening

- Performance by artists from Georgia, Ukraine, Belarus, Turkmenistan and Russia

- Musicians Sandro Bibich & Nodariko Khutsishvili & Zuka Simonishvili & Dato Kakulia will also perform on the event

- Experimental music by Tornike

A fixed donation of 25 GEL will be set at the entrance.  All collected donations will be divided between partner funds: Helping to leave, Paliashvili 60 and Library About Georgia. ⅔ amounts will be sent to help Ukraine and its residents, ⅓ funds will be transferred to help Georgian refugees.

Main point of our festival that we want to spread the word about:

  1.  Art is political.
  2. We are standing for an immediate cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine.
  3. We are for the complete withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of Georgia and for the complete de-occupation of Georgia.  Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region are territories of Georgia.
  4. We are against dictatorship in any form.
  5. We are against any discrimination, xenophobia and violence.
  6. Freedom for all political prisoners!

Location: Hermitspace (1 Vasil Petriashvili Street, Tbilisi)

Date: 4th of June 17:30-01:00

Georgian-Armenian relations - what is ahead

Published in Politics
Friday, 03 June 2022 16:48

In 2022 Georgia and Armenia have marked the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations. These relations saw several ups and downs for this turbulent for both countries period. The past three months have been marked with intensive exchange of high-profile visits between the countries.

The relatively decayed under the previous government Georgian-Armenian relations have been enlivened thanks to the efforts of Nikol Pashinyan and his government. Georgian-Armenian summits in the last December and this October held in Tbilisi and Yerevan entailed significant mutual steps for developing further bilateral trade and economic relations in the best possible way. These summits largely predetermined consecutive proactive bilateral dialogue at the level of the various agencies, which seems particularly important in the backdrop of the complicated geopolitical situation in the region. Currently bilateral trade economic relations are institutionalized through the Intergovernmental Commission on Economic Cooperation between the Republic of Armenia and Georgia.
Cross-border cooperation was also on the table of the recent talks between the parties given the sensitivity of the issue, especially after the second war in Karabakh. Some problems with regard to Georgian-Armenian border remain, despite attempts of the officials not to speak about loudly and publicly. One of the examples is village Khojorni situated on the territory of Georgia, but almost completely surrounded by Armenian territory. However, demarcation and delimitation of Georgian-Armenian border appears to be less problematic for Georgia as compared to the more difficult border dispute with Azerbaijan, largely associated with the David Gareja monastery complex.
Peaceful Neighborhood Initiative in the South Caucasus initiated by Georgian Prime-minister Irakli Garibashvili, which designs a format for a dialogue between the three nations and aims at the mutually-beneficial cooperation, was one of the subject of the high-profile discussions. Georgian party underlined its readiness to facilitate or mediate peace dialogue between Armenia and Azerbaijan. However, it appears that neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan show any significant interest in this initiative in the backdrop of mediation by far influential players such as Russia and European Union.
Nevertheless, both parties underlined aspiration of Yerevan and Tbilisi to give new impetus to the bilateral relations. Armenian officials have repeatedly highlighted that further promoting “special, good-neighborly” relations with Tbilisi is one of the priorities of the Armenian Government’s 2021-2026 action plan. Apart of the issues of regional security, the parties expressed readiness to step up bilateral cooperation in the areas of justice, human rights and public services. Both parties gave due attention to the worsening situation in Karabakh as an integral and important part of the regional security. PM Pashinyan stressed that the existing “high level of political dialogue between Armenia and Georgia” can be a foundation to further expand cooperation. 
Meanwhile, Georgia tries to keep sober balance in its relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan. Before the trip to Yerevan the new foreign minister Ilia Darchiashvili paid a visit to Baku having thereby emphasizing primacy of relations. Attitudes of Georgian citizens to Armenia and Azerbaijan differ respectively. The nationwide poll conducted by International Republican Institute this March, revealed that when answering the question: Which of these countries do you consider the most important political partners for Georgia? Turkey and Azerbaijan were named by 20% of respondents respectively, while only 7% named Armenia.
Despite optimistic public statements by Georgian and Armenian officials about deepening economic cooperation, Armenia tries to secure alternative routes of supply in evasion of the main land route through Georgia. Beginning June 15, the Armenian government plans to launch regular ferry transportation of goods across the Black Sea as an alternative to the only land road through the Upper Lars checkpoint connecting the country with Russia. The road through Upper Lars checkpoint, which connects Armenia with Russia is crucial for the Armenian economy. Armenian cargoes often end up stuck in queues for a long time due to weather conditions and limited capacity of Upper Lars. According to PM Pashinyan, Russian-Ukrainian war exacerbated these problems.

The agreement between Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia about unblocking transport communications in the region after the end of the second war in Karabakh, bred fear in Georgia that the country might be supplanted from the new transport and transit facilities in the region, and downgrade Georgia’s role as a transit country. For obvious reasons Georgia is suspiciously observing the attempts of Armenia and Turkey for comprehensive improvement of bilateral relations. The opening of their long-closed border as well as the restoration of diplomatic ties would have tremendous effects on the geopolitical picture of the region. The opening of the otherwise geographically closed region, which has been mostly dependent on Russia for infrastructure in recent decades, would open up and give Turkey a bigger stake in the region’s fate. The role of Iran cannot be downplayed as well.
Certainly, these perspectives heavily depend on the upcoming changes of the security architecture in the region which is directly linked with the consequences of the war in Ukraine.

Georgian-Armenian relations, war in Ukraine and geopolitics
Along with issues of bilateral cooperation, Georgian and Armenian officials gave due consideration to the impact of Russia’s war against Ukraine on the security architecture in the South Caucasus. This topic has acquired particular significance for the three South Caucasian states amid the continued accusations from the Ukrainian intelligence bodies that Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan are negotiating with Moscow over the reexport of Russian products to international markets in the form of Georgian, Armenian and Azerbaijani goods.
Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Armenia and Georgia have tried in different ways to balance the need for good relations with Moscow with a desire to support Ukraine. The conflict in Ukraine directly affects Armenia and Georgia’s behavior toward Russia and the West making them to maintain a careful balance between these two important partners. A clear indication of this effort was that in difference of Georgia, Armenia voted against revoking Russia’s membership in the Council of Europe and abstained in votes suspending Russia from the U.N. Human Rights Council and condemning Russia in U.N. At the same time, Armenia wants to maintain ties with the European Union (EU) and the West, but is not eager to support Ukraine because of Kyiv’s past support for Azerbaijan. As a result, Armenia has sought to signal its support for Russia without alienating the West.
Georgia's highly measured stance to the conflict in Ukraine, including refusal to impose sanctions on Russia and open the “second front,” what official Kyiv requests, are slightly different from the challenges, which Armenia and Azerbaijan are facing.
It must also be noted that imposing sanctions against Russia, which is highly likely to include significant restrictions of transportation through the Upper Larsi checkpoint – the sole land route connecting Armenia with Russia, will seriously harm both Georgian and Armenia’s economics, to say nothing about associated political complications. Outcome of the war in Ukraine is still uncertain. Had South Caucasian states entangled somehow in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, which increasingly transforms in the standoff between Russia and the West, they can easily find themselves as part of a fast-evolving wider confrontation with all afferent consequences. The Ukraine conflict gives Moscow less incentive to greenlight the normalization processes between Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan since they are pushing back against Russian influence in the area. Despite the key role it played in the 2020 war, Turkey found itself sidelined by Russia in the South Caucasus after the end of the fighting. Improving ties with Armenia represents “a chance to regain a seat at the table in regional trade and transport.
Fate of “3+3” format amid the war in Ukraine
The war in Ukraine has sidelined somehow the much-talked of “3+3 Format” declared as an instrument for establishing a lasting peace in the South Caucasus after the 44-day war in Karabakh. But letting alone the conflict in Ukraine, the format is torn apart by significant contradictions between the declared participants. This is particularly true with regard to Georgia and Armenia who have been reluctant or skeptical towards this format for their own reasons. After the first meeting in the "3+3" format on December 10, 2021 in Moscow attended by representatives of 5 countries: Azerbaijan, Armenia, Russia, Turkey and Iran except of Georgia, the next meeting has not been scheduled so far. Existing and future contradictions between the participants, including refusal of Georgia to join the "3+3" format, reduces its geostrategic and geopolitical value, making the format heavily dependent on the outcome of the war in Ukraine. Consequences of the war in Ukraine will significantly influence on the attitudes of the key players such as Turkey and Russia. In the light of Georgia’s demonstrated aspiration to integrate into European and Euro-Atlantic structures, its participation in the “3 + 3” format, aimed at supplanting the West as a player from the region, appears impossible. To this effect, cooperation between Armenia and Georgia will be important in order to be ready for all possible scenarios. In this regard, the initiative of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliev about interaction between Tbilisi, Baku and Yerevan in a trilateral format highlighted at the meeting with the Georgian foreign minister Ilia Darchiachvili during his visit in Baku this April, deserves attention. So far, the initiative has not been developed further, most likely because of the new cycle of Armenia-Azerbaijani tensions. When speaking about the future of “3+3” format, some Georgian experts suggested that Armenia and Georgia should come up with the “3+3+2” initiative, where “2” should be the European Union and the United States. Only time will tell whether “3+3” survive as a geopolitical project and how and whether Georgia and Armenia will benefit from it.

Conclusion
All in all, both Georgia and Armenia, which belong to the different blocs, most likely are not under the illusions of overcoming natural barriers caused by this factor. Meanwhile, due to the circumstances caused by the second war in Karabakh, one the one hand, and the ongoing war in Ukraine, on the other, political leadership of both countries are aware of the looming challenges. Therefore, the changed geopolitical realities in the South Caucasus and around, bolster Tbilisi and Yerevan to build the type of relations that would help each party retrieve maximum economic and political benefits. Rapprochement of the attitudes on the divisive issues, creating stable and trusting relationships with a higher degree of predictability, appears to be the result, which both parties could expect in the short and mid-term perspective. Achievement of this result might create a groundwork for propelling the bilateral relations at a new level.

By Zaal Anjaparidze

Zaal Anjaparidze works for International Center on Conflict and Negotiation (www.iccn.ge) as program coordinator for peace dialogue in S. Caucasus. Zeal coordinated engagement of civil society organizations, youth groups and peace journalists of the South Caucasian states in the conflict prevention and confidence building.
In 2017, he was manager of the EU-funded project in the Czech non-governmental organization People in Need (www.pin.ge). During 2005-2016, Zaal worked as senior program manager for civil society development program at Europe Foundation (www.epfound.ge). For 1994-2004, worked for the USAID international projects in Georgia (Сhemonics International, the Urban Institute, Barents Group), the Caucasian Institute for Peace Democracy and Development (www.cippd.org) and editor-in-chief of "GEORGIA TODAY" weekly (www.georgiatoday.ge).
Since 1997 to date, Zaal Anjaparidze has been a Georgian contributor and analyst for Jamestown Foundation (www.jamestown.org). Mr. Anjaparidze writes extensively about major events and trends in Georgia and Caucasus for the various national, regional and international editions and think tanks.

 

GLOBALink | Russia-Ukraine conflict: 100 days in 100 seconds

Published in CHINA
Friday, 03 June 2022 13:29

June 3 marks the 100th day of Russia's special military operation in Ukraine. The following is a review of key events of the 100-day conflict between Russia and Ukraine.

Produced by Xinhua Global Service

 

EU ambassadors approve sixth sanctions package against Russia and Belarus

Published in Economics
Friday, 03 June 2022 10:44

On 2 June, the Committee of Permanent Representatives in the European Union (COREPER II) agreed to the sixth package of sanctions, proposed by the Extraordinary European Council on 30 May. 

This sanctions package includes:

  • Sanctions against members of the security and military apparatus, notably linked to the Bucha massacres, entities in the industrial and technological sector linked to Russian aggression, oligarchs, Russian propaganda actors and their family members.
  • The ban on oil imports from Russia by sea. This ban, combined with national decisions by Germany and Poland, will reduce Russian oil imports by 92% by the end of the year. 
  • It will be complemented as soon as possible by a ban on oil imports from Russia by pipeline.
  • The disconnection from the Swift system of three Russian banks, including Sberbank, and one Belarusian bank. 
  • The extension of export bans to Russia, including on chemicals and high-tech goods.
  • A ban on the provision of services to the Russian oil sector.
  • A ban on three Russian media outlets involved in the dissemination of propaganda.
  • A ban on consultancy services for Russian operators.

This package of sanctions will be adopted by the Council by written procedure with a view to its publication tomorrow in the Official Journal of the EU.

Find out more

Press release

European Commission proposes rules on freezing and confiscating assets of oligarchs and other criminals violating restrictive measures

Published in World
Thursday, 26 May 2022 12:16

On 25 May, the European Commission proposed the inclusion of violations of EU restrictive measures in the EU’s list of crimes, in light of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. This will allow to set a common basic standard on criminal offences and penalties across the EU.

The Commission has also proposed new strengthened rules on asset recovery and confiscation, which would also facilitate the implementation of EU restrictive measures. The proposal would modernise EU asset recovery rules, in particular by expanding the powers of Asset Recovery Offices to quickly trace and identify the assets of individuals and entities subject to EU restrictive measures. These powers would also apply to criminally derived assets, including through the urgent freezing of assets where there is a risk that assets may disappear.

“EU sanctions must be respected and those trying to go around them punished. The violation of EU sanctions is a serious crime and must come with serious consequences, said Věra Jourová, the European Commission’s Vice-President for Values and Transparency. “As a Union we stand up for our values and we must make those who keep Putin’s war machine running pay the price.”     

The proposals have been put forward as part of the ‘Freeze and Seize’ Task Force, set up by the European Commission in March.  So far, Member States have reported frozen assets worth €9.89 billion and blocked €196 billion worth of transactions. On 11 April, Europol, jointly with Member States, Eurojust and Frontex, launched Operation Oscar to support financial and criminal investigations targeting criminal assets owned by individuals and legal entities covered by EU sanctions.

Once the EU Member States agree on the Commission’s initiative to extend the list of EU crimes, the Commission will present a legislative proposal based on the accompanying Communication and Annex.

Find out more

Press release

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